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Abstract
This paper investigates the measurement of anticipated interest rate policy and the
effects of these expectations on the term structure of nominal interest rates. It is
shown that, under the expectations hypothesis, the level of long-term interest rates
depends on three factors: the level of the monetary policy interest rate, ie the
steering rate; the spread between the market interest rate and the steering rate; and
market expectations of the next steering rate change. The theoretical model builds
on the assumption that market participants have only imperfect knowledge of the
mechanism whereby changes in the steering rate are determined. As a
consequence, expectations formation, although realistic, need not be entirely
rational. Steering rate changes take the form of discrete jumps and occur
infrequently on a daily scale. Given these assumptions, discussion of the
determination of the term structure is related to the literature on uncertainty about
monetary policy regimes and small samples, ie “peso” problems.
Empirical analysis based on Nelson-Siegel estimates of the daily yield curves
in Finland in the period 1 January 1993 to 31 October 1997 complements the
theoretical discussion. The observed differences between estimated market
expectations and actual tender rate changes are quite large in the sample,
particularly for the longer maturities. The approach applied in this study is
promising, not only in the sense of potentially providing estimates of market
expectations concerning future discrete changes in monetary policy interest rates
but also in the sense of its apparent potential in accounting for the often reported
poor empirical performance of the expectations hypothesis.
Keywords: term structure of interest rates, expectations, target changes, peso
problems4
Rahapolitiikkaa koskevat odotukset ja korkojen
aikarakenteen dynamiikka
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 12/99
Jarkko Jääskelä – Jouko Vilmunen
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan rahapolitiikan ohjauskorkoja koskevien odo-
tusten mittaamista ja näiden odotusten vaikutuksia nimelliskorkoihin. Korkojen
aikarakennetta selittävän odotushypoteesin mukaan markkinakorkojen dynamiik-
ka riippuu kolmesta tekijästä: ohjauskorosta, markkinakoron ja ohjauskoron väli-
sestä erosta sekä tulevia ohjauskoron muutoksia koskevista markkinoiden odotuk-
sista. Ratkaisevaa tarkastelujen teoreettisissa perusteissa on oletus, että rahamark-
kinoilla ei ole täydellistä tietämystä rahapolitiikan ohjauskoron määräytymisme-
kanismista. Odotustenmuodostus saattaa siis olla jossain määrin epärationaalista.
Ohjauskorkojen oletetaan muuttuvan hyppäyksittäin ja muutosten oletetaan lisäksi
olevan harvinaisia päivittäiseen kehitykseen nähden. Valitsemamme lähestymista-
pa liittää korkojen aikaranteen tutkimuksen rahapolitiikan epävarmuuksia ja
lyhyitä aikasarjoja eli ns. peso-ongelmia käsittelevään kirjallisuuteen.
Empiirinen analyysi perustuu Nelsonin–Siegelin menetelmällä estimoituihin
päivittäisiin korkojen aikarakenteisiin Suomessa 1.1.1993–30.10.1997. Estimoitu-
jen korko-odotusten ja toteutuneiden Suomen Pankin ohjauskorkojen väliset erot
ovat tulosten perusteella selkeitä, varsinkin pitkissä maturiteeteissa. Työssä sovel-
lettua korko-odotusten mallinnus- ja mittaamistapaa pidetään lupaavana, koska
sen avulla saadaan arvio rahapolitiikan tulevia korkoja koskevista odotuksista ja
koska lähestymistapa ratkaisee odotushypoteesiin liittyviä ongelmia korkojen
aikarakenteen muutosten selittäjänä.
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1 Introduction
Even at the risk of oversimplifying matters, we could argue that economist have
come to think about the effects of monetary policy on the (nominal) term structure
of interest rates either in terms of its effects on inflation expectations or in terms
of the liquidity effects. According to the former monetary policy predominantly
affects the expected inflation component of longer-term interest rates; hence it
implicitly assumes that the effects of monetary policy on real interest rates are of
second order and that inflation risk premiums are typically small. The liquidity
effect,
1 which is familiar from e.g. standard textbook IS-LM models , on the other
hand, operates through the time-variability of the (short-term) real interest rate,
and builds on the idea that inflation is fully reflected in nominal interest rates only
in the long-run. In particular, monetary policy can generate movements in the real
interest rates over shorter periods of time.
2
Interesting and important as these channels are, they do seem to downplay the
role of the stance of monetary policy when market participants evaluate the likely
paths taken by future short-term interest rates. If we want to argue that the term
structure of interest rates can be characterised as a crucial transmission channel of
monetary policy where accurate market perceptions are required for effective
policy execution, then the idea that the stance of monetary policy matters for the
view taken by the market participants of future short-term interest rates must be
taken seriously. The reason is threefold. First more often than not nowadays a
short-term interest rate can be taken as an effective summary of monetary policy
actions. Secondly, longer-term bond yields are important determinants of the
opportunity cost of investment and, thirdly, under the expectations theory of the
term structure of interest rates, EHTS for short, the anticipated path of the policy
driven short-term interest rate is the main determinant of the term structure of
bond yields.
3
Of course, the (empirical) validity of each of these three propositions can be
criticised – and have been criticised and probably will continue to be criticised –
but it is the implications of the EHTS that has almost regularly been tested in new
and different data sets, with perhaps an overwhelming majority of the research
work concluding against it.
4 But on the back of this non-supporting empirical
                                                
1 The intended implication here is not that only IS-LM – models contain a liquidity effect. For
example, any model with a Baumol-Tobin style transaction cost for converting securities into
money (anticipated or not) must lead initially to a drop in the nominal interest rate (Aiyagari and
Braun 1998, p. 4. The authors discuss the pure liquidity effect in a model, where households face
convex costs of going to the financial market to adjust their portfolios of money and intere bearing
securities. They interprete this model as an analytically tractable GE-version of a Baumol-Tobin
transaction cost model of money demand.)
2 See the papers in the Federal Reserve of St. Louis publication (1995) on the liquidity effect. Note
that the reasoning in the main text is not meant to imply that the two channels are independent. It
is conceivable that (certain) monetary policy actions can generate liquidity effects and shifts in
expected inflation (held by the market). Mishkin’s analyses (1995a,b) on the validity of the Fisher
effect – that the nominal interest rate is equal to the sum of the real interest rate and expected
inflation – support the existence of liquidity effects in that his results suggest that the Fisher effect
can be taken to hold only in the long-run. So, movements in inflation is not fully reflected in
nominal interest rates over shorter periods of time.
3 The underlying reasoning as well as the wording here is heavily influenced by Kozicki and
Tinsley (1999).
4 See e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991), Shiller (1991), Bekaert et al. (1997a,b).8
evidence of the EHTS, the situation is puzzling in the sense that if variations in
current bond yields are not tightly related to current and expected movements in
the policy-driven short-term interest rate, then the conventional description of
monetary policy transmission is vacuous, as also pointed out by Kozicki and
Tinsley (1998). That is, the link between short-term interest rates – the “steering
rate” or the principal monetary policy instrument – and expected inflation – a
long-run monetary policy objective and a major determinant of longer term yields
– should be reconsidered and an integral part of the conventional approach, the
EHTS, must be set aside and replaced by an alternative, better and more data
coherent model.
In an arbitrage-free equilibrium temporal variation of long-term bond yields
due to current and expected movements in short rates is mainly – and in its pure
form, solely – determined by the dynamic behaviour of the short-term interest
rates. Under the standard finance assumption that short rates are mean reverting,
the average of expected future short rates is considerably smoother than historical
bond rates. Thus, typically the EHTS is empirically rejected by tests that assume
constant “liquidity” or “term” premiums.
5
One of the most often tested empirical implication of the EHTS is that the
term spread – the slope of the yield curve or the difference between the long and
short term interest rate – should forecast future changes in (short-term) interest
rates. The bulk of the evidence on the U.S. term structure data,
6 however, suggests
that there is only a weak link between the slope of the term structure and future
changes in (short-term) interest rates.
7 The evidence is clearly puzzling. One of
the proposed explanations, by Mankiw and Miron (MM, 1986), relates this
evidence to the behaviour of the Federal Reserve. More specifically, they argue
that prior to the founding of the Fed, the term spread forecasted future changes in
short-term interest rates relatively accurately. Strongly mean-reverting and highly
seasonal short-term interest rates were the main underlying reasons for their
forecastability. Interest rate smoothing, on the other hand, by the Fed since its
inception has been so successful in the elimination of the previously observed
seasonal pattern as well as in the reduction of interest rate volatility.
8 An
additional outcome of the policy of interest rate smoothing by the Fed was that
interest rates started displaying martingale properties, i.e. as if being generated by
a random walk. Hence, changes in (short-term) interest rates became largely
unpredictable, in particular displaying essentially no correlation to the current
term spread.
As noted by BBFK (1998, p. 26), an important implication of the MM (1986)
analysis is that by targeting the overnight (O/N) fed funds rate, the Fed effectively
enjoys a substantial amount of control over term fed fund rates and longer-term
                                                
5 Kozicki and Tinsley (1999, p. 1). However, as the authors also note, postwar data are consistent
with descriptions of short rate movements other than mean reversion. Kozicki and Tinsley show
that small differences in the specification of the stochastic process for the short rate strongly
influence the importance of short rate expectations and residual term premiums in bond rate
movements.
6 The U.S. term structure of interest rates have hitherto been most intensely subjected to empirical
scrutiny. The evidence seems to be more favourable to the EHTS in e.g. German and UK term
structure data and in countries under fixed exchange rate regimes (Gerlach 1995, 1997).
7 Most often sited references are Campbell (1995), Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) and
Shiller (1990). See also Bekaert et al. (1996, 1997).
8 See also Balduzzi, Bertola, Foresi and Klapper (BBFK, 1998) and Mankiw, Miron and Weil
(1987).9
yields. This implication clearly holds more generally in cases where a central
bank successfully follows a policy of interest rate smoothing or stabilisation.
9
Goodfriend (1991) suggests that the targeting of the O/N fed funds rate is
implemented with exactly this goal, since longer-term rates are more strongly
linked to the macroeconomics goals such as growth (unemployment) and price
stability (or low inflation) (BBFK 1998, p. 26). As for the desirability of pursuing
a policy of interest rate smoothing the existing literature often suggests a
preference to avoid “whipsawing” the bond market (Goodfriend 1991), to contain
the variability of the inflation tax (Barro 1989) and to stabilise the macroeconomy
(Mankiw, Miron and Weil, 1987).
A number of recent contributions have documented a new set of stylized facts
concerning the relation between interest rate targetting and the dynamics of short-
term interest rates, as well as suggested models and explanations to account for
these new observations. More specifically, BBFK (1998) show that during the
1989–1996 period, the Fed was able to closely target the O/N fed funds rate, and
especially to reduce the persistence of its spreads from the target: these spreads
average one percentage point, and exhibit an autocorrelation of only 0.07, after
one day. Still, term fed funds rates of maturity up to three months fluctuated
widely and persistently around the target. More precisely and perhaps
surprisingly, BBFK (1998) document that both the volatility and persistence of
spreads of term fed funds rates from the target is an increasing function of the
maturity of the underlying debt instrument. BBFK suggest an interpretation of this
particular set of observations (1998, p. 27): while central bank (Fed) intervention
is important in determining the shape and position of the term structure, even a
tight targeting of the O/N fed funds rate does not mechanically translate into a
tight control of longer-term interest rates.
Under the expectations view of the term structure of interest rates, these new
observations documented by BBFK (1998) are indeed surprising, as the authors
also note (p. 27) and, at first sight at least, perhaps a little bit puzzling too; if
future target changes are unpredictable, and fluctuations in the O/N interest rate
are short-lived, then spreads of term fed funds from the target should not exhibit
excessive volatility or persistence, let alone volatility and persistence that are
increasing with the maturity of the underlying debt instrument. Furthermore, a
longer-term interest rate should, if anything, display less volatility and
persistence, since its term allows more time for the O/N interest rate to revert back
to the expected future target, which, given unpredictable future target changes,
would equal the current target. Hence, we can conclude that the presence of
volatile and persistent spreads of fed funds rates from the target indicates that
future target changes are predictable (BBFK 1998, p. 27).
Prevailing institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy in
several countries has come to emphasise managing interest rates in the conduct of
monetary policy. Concurrently, the relative importance of monetary aggregates
has fallen. Whereas the O/N interest rate on fed funds is the prime instrument of
                                                
9 Such a policy can, of course, be sustained by explicit targeting of the central bank’s interest rate
instrument (steering rate). More generally, however, targeting may be only implicit, and we should
perhaps talk about central banks adjusting their interest rate instrument infrequently (by discrete
amounts) as if they are trying to convey to the market information about the preferred or expected
level of interest rates. Such infrequent revisions in the interest rate instrument may result in the
mean level of the market interest rates, the central tendency, as Balduzzi, Das, Foresi and
Sundaram (1998) call it, changing (slowly and) stochastically over time.10
the Fed, the one month tender rate is the key interest rate instrument – the steering
rate – of the Bank of Finland (BoF). Given the steering rate of a central bank, the
relevant market interest rate (or yield) – i.e. the yield whose term matches that of
the central bank’s steering rate – can be modelled as the sum of two components;
the steering rate, or the “target” as it will also be henceforth called, and the
deviations of the yield from this target. As stochastic processes, there is typically
at least one fundamental difference between these two components. The
deviations from the target are generated by mean reverting (to zero) processes,
since these processes, in turn, are fundamentally the outcome of continuous
market equilibrium. The target, on the other hand, is typically changed only
infrequently and by (small) discrete amounts. Furthermore the target is changed
by the central bank in a way that imparts a martingale-like behaviour to the
interest rates.
10
Now, longer-term interest rates, which under the maintained hypothesis of the
EHTS are averages of expected future short-term interest rates, are affected by
these two components of the relevant short-term interest rate differently
depending, in particular, on the term of the underlying debt instrument. More
specifically, shorter-term interest rates are predominantly affected by the
dynamics of the spread around the target, whereas expected future target changes
are the major driving force for longer-term interest rates. The intuition here is the
following. As the term of the debt instrument under consideration increases, it is
more likely that there will be at least one target change by the maturity of this
instrument. On the other hand, the longer term allows more time for deviations
from the target to die out. Hence, the expected level of the target should gain
relatively more weight in the determination of longer-term interest rates.
BBF (1993) introduce a simple model which formalises the idea that a central
bank’s, in their case the Fed’s, style of policy implementation or policy
intervention may only loose control even short-term interest rates.
11 That is, even
under successful interest rate targetting, spreads from the target at different
maturities are generated by nontrivial stochastic processes. The model formalises
the martingale view of interest rate targetting policies, while simultaneously
extending MM’s (12986) framework to account for the infrequent character of
real-life target changes on a daily time scale. Furthermore the model allows for
misunderstandings between market participants and monetary authorities: for an
unspecified reason the structure of the Fed’s decision making process (concerning
target changes) may only be imperfectly known to market participants; hence
market expectation concerning the next target change may not be rational in the
sense of being based on the “relevant economic model”.
The model takes an expectations view of the determination of the relation
between the O/N fed funds rate and longer-term interest rates and allows the
authors to extract from interest rate and target data an estimate of the size and
direction of future target changes as expected by the market. The (closed form
solution of the) model implies that the level of longer-term interest rates have a
three factor structure, or that the spread of a longer-term interest rate from the
O/N target has a two factor structure. More precisely, the longer-term spreads are
                                                
10 Here we draw heavily from Balduzzi, Bertola and Foresi (BBF 1997).
11 Rudebusch (1995) also analyses the effects of interest rate targeting on the term structure of
interest rates. His model differs from BBF (1993) in that he assumes that the expected size of the
next target change is solely determined by the last realised one. Also, see Barro (1989) on interest
rate targeting.11
driven by the spread of the O/N interest rate from the target and the market
expectation of the next target change. BBF (1993) take their model to the U.S.
data. Their modelling approach provides an interpretation of the often reported
poor performance of or bias in the tests of the EHTS, suggesting that it is the
policy induced component of fed funds dynamics to be erroneously anticipated by
the market (1993, p. 2). That is, given that the variation in the fed funds rate is
generated mainly by changes in the targets rather than by fluctuations about the
target – which are strongly mean reverting – the authors provide evidence
indicating that the bias pertains to the policy induced dynamics of the fed funds
rate (BBF 1993, p. 22). Overall the authors conclude that even though some
features of interest rate targetting are rationally incorporated into market
expectations, the process of target changes is not well anticipated by the market.
This implies, importantly, that we may never be able to eliminate the expectation
biases through specification searches on more sophisticated mechanisms of
expectation formation and data generation, although the search process may
enhance our understanding about their sources (BBF 1993, p. 22).
BBFK (1998) develop the model introduced by BBF (1993) further to account
for the observed correlation structure of the spreads of the term fed funds rates
alluded to above. BBFK argue (1998, p. 27) that the model incorporates three
realistic features of interest rate targetting on the part of the Fed: i) spreads of the
overnight fed funds rate from the target, while short-lived, are nonzero; ii) target
changes occur infrequently, on a daily scale; and iii) changes in the target are
somewhat predictable. The intuition underlying the third feature is that is all the
“adjustment pressures” are released at the time of the target change, immediately
after the target change ivestors start receiving and processing new information to
help them to predict the next target change (BBFK 1998, p. 28). As the authors
note (BBFK 1998, p. 28) this is consistent with evidence that target changes cause
large, but less than one-to-one positive changes in longer-term interest rates.
BBFK (1998) estimate the model on the U.S. data on nominal term fed funds rates
and conclude that the model successfully replicates the stylised fact that the
autocovariance of the spreads of term fed funds rates from the target increase with
the maturity of the debt instrument, because longer-term interest rates reflect more
heavily persistent expectations of the next target change. The estimate they obtain
of the volatility of the unobservable market expectations factor driving nominal
interest rates
12 seems plausible.
The idea that  ex post there may be persistent differences between the realised
fed fund target rate and private sector expectations of it – forecast errors may
appear ex post biased – brings the modelling approach of BBF (1993) closer to the
literature on perceived regime uncertainty or peso problems as it is more
commonly termed.
13 Peso problem arise from (perverse) expectational relations,
                                                
12 As noted by the authors (BBFK 1998, p. 28), the volatility of the next-target-change expectation
is especially interesting from the perspective of monetary policy. Not only can it be viewed as an
indicator of how noisy the information acquisition process is – or of how successful the Fed is in
keeping its policy intentions secret and preserving a discretionary role for policy – but also of how
loose the Fed’s control on longer-term interest rates is.
13 For an excellent survey on “peso problems” in an asset pricing context, see Evans (1996). See
also Evans (1998) on regime shifts, risk and term structure, where the author argues, on the basis
of his empirical analysis, that peso problems originating from instability in the inflation process
have significantly contributed to the behaviour of the U.K. term structure. For the macroeconomic
effects of peso problems, see Vilmunen (1998). Finally, the work on interest rate differentials in12
or distributional peculiarities as Obstfelt (1987) puts it, that will affect private
sector behaviour because of forward looking behaviour. Looming future shifts in
the distribution of exogenous factors or shocks will impinge on agents’ current
behaviour. The length of commonly used or available historical data, on the other
hand, may be too short for them to be representative of the distribution underlying
agents’ expectations formation. Hence persistent differences between realised and
expected market outcomes tend to occur ex post, apparently militating against the
tenet of rational expectations. It is, however, well understood that the presence of
peso problems may be entirely consistent with rational expectations. The presence
of peso problems may raise the need to address more substantial policy problems,
but in their contributions BBF (1997) and BBFK (1998) abstract from the
potential policy implications and instead focus solely on expectational relations
that arise between nominal interest rates of different term to maturity under the
maintained hypothesis of EHTS.
In this paper we will take the model introduced by BBF (1997) and further
developed by BBFK (1998) to the newly constructed data on Finnish government
bonds. The chief motivation for the work done in this paper derives from the very
fundamental idea underlying BBF’s (1997) approach, namely that (misperceived)
policy-induced dynamics of interest rates may have a significant effect on the
dynamic behaviour of the term structure of interest rates. We do not think that the
model’s applicability rests too critically on those specific institutional features of
monetary policy used by BBF (1997) – i.e. those pertaining to the Fed’s policy
during the sample period of the their study – to motivate it (or its formal
structure). In particular, we do not think that explicit interest rate targeting à la
Fed is the fundamental feature that backs up the formal structure of the BBF
(1997) model or the idea that the formal structure of their model fundamentally
reflects. In this paper we argue that the approach taken by BBF (1997) can be
applied more generally to, at least, policy environments that do not involve
explicit interest rate targeting. A plausible approach to the interest rate policy
pursuit by increasingly many modern central banks is to view the policy from the
perspective of “giving the market the mean or central tendency”. This central
tendency is a slowly changing component of interest rates, and its changes are
fundamentally affected by policy decisions to change key central bank interest
rate instruments. Changes in these key interest rate instruments, in turn, typically
occur infrequently and in discrete amounts.
Hence, in this paper we prefer to interpret interest rate targeting in more
broader terms to refer the case where the policy component of interest rates is a
process that changes only infrequently and by discrete amounts as a result of the
decisions taken by the monetary authority over its steering rate. Under this
interpretation, the approach by BBF (1997) can be applied to a country like
Finland, where the institutional framework of monetary policy does not involve
strict targeting of the O/N interest rate. However, we want to focus on market
expectations concerning (the next change of) the Bank of Finland steering rate –
the one month’s tender rate – and on obtaining a measure of these expectations
using the EHTS as the workhorse for the analysis, given that the underlying
dynamics of the tender rate changes may be only imperfectly understood by
market participants.
                                                                                                                                     
the exchange rate literature is also relevant in the present context; see the reference cited in BBF
(1997).13
The paper proceeds as follows. In chapter two, we describe the model of
target changes introduced by BBF (1997) and also give some institutional
information concerning the conduct of monetary policy in Finland prior to start of
the monetary union among the 11 of the 15 European Community countries in
January 1, 1999. Section three takes the model to the data on yields on Finnish
government bonds, obtained by estimating the underlying zero-coupon yield
curves by the method of Nelson and Siegel. Appendix 2 gives a short description
of the Nelson-Siegel mehtod. Section four summarises and further discusses the
approach taken in this paper, in particular from the perspective of modelling the
term structure of interest rate in a small open economy like Finland. Appendix 1
provides statistical estimates of the critical parameters of the model.
2 A simple term structure model under interest
rate targeting
In the ensuing analysis, time will be discrete and the we will refer to the one
month money market rate as the “short(-term interest) rate”. The reason is a
simple one; the key BoF interest rate instrument during the period of analysis used
to be the one month’s tender rate. Also we will interchangeably use the term
“target rate”, “tender rate” or “steering rate” – for the reasons outlined in the final
paragraphs of the previous, introductory section – when we refer to this BoF
interest rate instrument.
Measurements will be taken and events will be observed on a daily time scale.
The short term interest rate on day t, 
m
t r , say (m = a month or 30 days), can be
decomposed into the sum of the tender rate, 
m
t r , and the deviation of the short rate
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The approach taken to modelling these components of the short rate build, firstly,
on the assumption that successful interest rate policy by the central bank induces
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t r r k 1 r r e + - - = - - - (2)
Note that for a positive mean reversion parameter k, the spread process in (2)
exhibits mean reversion toward zero, i.e. there is a tendency for the short rate to
converge to the tender rate. Note further that the short rate process is more tightly
targeted – or the central bank is more successful in steering the short rate – the
smaller the standard deviation s of the error process et, and the higher the mean
reversion parameter k (BBF 1997, p. 230).
The link from the short rate dynamics to the longer-term interest rates rests,
on the other hand, on the linearized version of the expectations theory of the term14
structure.
14 Fundamentally, arbitrage keeps the longer-term interest rates in line












t å = (3)
where h = t/m is assumed to be an integer. So that the yield 
t
t R  on t days
maturity loan – zero coupon bond – is an average of the expected future short
term – m days – interest rates prevailing during the life of the debt instrument.
Note that in (3) the emphasis is on expectations held by the market participants;
the possibility of deviations from full rational expectations – that the conditional
expectations operator Et refers to the true or relevant underlying model – is
implicitly allowed for in (3). One possible source of such deviations is associated
with market misperceptions about the dynamics of the tender rate.
Here we shall not go deep to derive the full set of implications generated by
the EHTS, nor discuss their empirical validity.
15 However, from the point of view
of the present paper, perhaps one of the most important implications is that the
spread between the short term interest rate and the tender rate should predict
future changes in the tender rate. The evidence in the U.S. data seems to suggest
that this implication cannot be rejected the U.S. Note that the formulation of the
EHTS in (3) could be augmented with a constant, maturity specific term
premiums without affecting the time-series behaviour of the short-term interest
rates derived from the model. Time varying term premiums would of course alter
the analysis, as it would also undermine the validity of the EHTS as a model of
the (equilibrium) relationship between interest rates. This is shown more
fundamentally by Bekaert et al. (1997), who demonstrate, using the approach
based on pricing kernels or stochastic discount factors, that the EHTS holds if the
pricing kernel is conditionally homoscedastic in the strong sense that all of the
moments of its distribution are time-invariant. In particular, the EHTS is
consistent  with any amount of risk aversion, provided this time-invariance of the
pricing kernel’s conditional moments holds.
16
The dynamic behaviour of the target, 
m
t r , is not based on an explicit model of
how the Bank of Finland determines changes in its tender rate. Following BBF
(1997), we model the process of tender rate changes as it is actually implemented
and perceived by the market. Tender rate changes are assumed to be independent
from the process in (1) and to be infrequent, with n < 1 the known probability of a
tender rate change on any day t. Moreover, the Bank of Finland usually revises the
tender rate by small increments. In the U.S. case, BBFK (1998, p. 36) argue that
                                                
14 See e.g. Shiller et al. (1983).
15 See e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991), Shiller (1991), Bekaert et al. (1996) and Bekaert et al.
(1997), to mention just a few from a large literature.
16 The so-called unbiased expectations hypothesis (UEH) says that forward rates equal the
conditional expectations of future spot rates. Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) claim that the UEH is
not consistent with general equilibrium continuous time models as well as with discrete time
models with continuous compounding of yields. McCulloch (1993) provides a counterexample to
the CIR’s claim. His example does not admit a representation in terms of a finite number of
Markovian state variables, which is the setting in CIR. McCulloch suggests that CIR’s claim may
be true within their setting. But Fisher and Gilles (1998) show that this is not the case. They show
how to construct models of the term structure of interest rates in which the expectations hypothesis
holds.15
this reflects the fact the Fed does not want to “whipsaw” (Goodfriend, 1991) the
bond market. Whether this is also the deep underlying motivation for the Bank of
Finland’s behaviour or whether it simply reflects the idea that when steering
interest rates, the central bank is deeply engaged in a process of search (for an
appropriate timing to and size of change of the tender rate), where gradualism is a
virtue. Optimality may sustain gradualism e.g. because of the nature and quality
of the incoming information about the state of the economy: latest information
about the economy is typically not the final word, and data about the economy is
instead more often than not revised in the course of time.
Furthermore, we share the assumption of BBF (1997) and BBFK (1998) that
tender rate changes are not influenced by temporary spreads of the short rate from
the tender rate. When a sizeable change in the tender rate is required, several
small changes of the same sign are implemented, which implies that there is a
positive serial correlation in tender rate changes. Formally, we postulate
accordingly that




N r r x + D r = D - (4)
where Nt denotes the number of tender rate changes between time zero and t, 0 <
r < 1 quantifies the degree of serial correlation in tender rate changes, and 
t N x  is
a zero mean, serially uncorrelated error independent of et. Note that according to
(4), the unconditional mean of tender rate changes is zero and that at the time of a
tender rate change – time t, say – market participant forecast the next tender rate
change to be 
m
Nt r D r . Hence, forecasts or expected tender rate changes can in
principle take any value in the range ( )
m
Nt r , 0 D , given that r takes values between
zero and one, although actual tender rate changes have typically been multiples of
five bps, as if drawn from a discrete-value distribution for tender rate changes.
17
In any case, denote by zt the time-t market expectation of the size of the next
tender rate change, formed at the end of day t;  ( )
m
t ˆ t t r E z D = , where t ˆ denotes the
time next tender rate changes occurs.
The way market expectation zt has been defined, implies that a) it need not be
a rational expectation. In other words, there may be even systematic discrepancies
between the market expectation zt and the process governing actual tender rate
changes. Of course, in reality market expectations probably depend in a complex
way on all the policy-relevant information, which renders formal modelling of
market expectations practically speaking impossible. This being the case,
simplicity and minimalism has some virtues. Hence, the above short-cut to
defining market expectation is followed instead. Furthermore, rationality as such
is not the focus of the paper, but the dynamic behaviour of interest rate spreads is.
Note, however, that by definition, the market revision represented by changes in zt
are unpredictable: only new information should induce the market to revise its
expectation of future tender rate changes occurring at time t ˆ.
b) zt is the market expectation of the size of the next tender rate change
irrespective of when the change will take place. This means that markets expect
                                                
17 As also noted by BBFK (1998, p. 36) expected future tender rate changes are weighted averages
of these multiples, so (2) is not inconsistent with the institutional feature of the Bank of Finland
changing the tender rate by discrete amounts. Rudebusch (1995) explicitly accounts for this
institutional feature by assuming a discrete value distribution for target changes.16
the same interest rate change whether it is implemented tomorrow or several days
from now. This implies that the time elapsed since the last tender rate change
affects neither the realisation of a tender rate change nor the market expectation of
the next change zt. As noted by BBFK (1998, p. 37) the market expectation is in
this respect assumed to be consistent with the realisations. This assumption
simplifies the ensuing calculations considerably, but we also tested whether it is
rejected by the data. The results are reported in Table A3 in Appendix 2, where
the absolute size of a tender rate change is regressed on the length of the time
interval since the last tender rate change. The results indicate that the regressor
does not enter significantly so that the assumption is not inconsistent with the
empirical evidence.
But how does the market expectation evolve through time? Above it was
pointed out that only new information should induce market to revise its
expectation. Hence the market expectation should behave like a martingale (or a
random walk), when tender rate changes are not realised. The implied behaviour
is also consistent with the market updating its expectation of the next tender rate
change whose size also changes day to day in an unpredictable fashion (BBFK,
1998, p. 37).
On the day of a target change the market expectation zt is related to the
realised tender rate change through the serial correlation parameter r. The model
for zt is thus
t at change target a is there if , r




t 1 t t
z + D r =
z + = - (5)
where zt is a zero mean serially uncorrelated error, independent of et and with
volatility sz. The idea underlying the error term is that immediately after a target
change the market accumulates information on the next one.
Since the probability of a tender rate change taking place on any given day is
assumed to be constant,
18 the number of tender rate changes in any s periods is a
Binomially distributed random variable with parameters s and n. Hence the
probability that there will be n tender rate changes in s periods is given by
n s n ) 1 (
n







for s ³ n.
19 Once again, the assumption of a constant daily rate of tender rate
changes is made to simplify the modelling process. Table A3 in Appendix 2, on
the other hand reports the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the null that the random
variable defined as the length of the no-tender-rate-change spells has a geometric
                                                
18 I.e. tender rate changes are modelled here as outcomes in Bernoulli trials, where the probability
of an event – tender rate change on any given day – occuring in a single trial is constant.
19 For future reference note that the probability generating function G(t) = E(t
x) of the Binomial
(s, n) distribution is G(t) = (1–n+nt)
s = (1–n(1–t))
s. This can be proved by expanding the
expression (a + b)
s using binomial coefficients.17
distribution
20 (with constant n). At conventional significance levels, the test does
not reject the null of a geometric distribution (see also Figure 1). This result is
thus consistent with BBF (1997) and BBFK (1998) and also with Rudebusch
(1995), who finds that for the 1974–1987 period, the daily probabilities of target
changes exhibit most of their varaibility during the first seven days from the last
change, and are essentially constant after 24 days (BBFK 1998, p.37). As in BBF
(1997) and BBFK (1998), we also tested the modelling assumption further by
regressing the length of the time since the last tender rate change on the absolute
size of the last tender rate change. The results are given in Table A3 in Appendix
2. Intuitively, this test seeks evidence in favour of the idea that a large tender rate
change makes a new tender rate change soon after more or less likely. The
regression test could not pick any significant effects.
Under the stated assumption, the longer-term yields can be given a closed
form analytical solutions where interest rates are linear in three factors: i) the
current tender rate, 
m




m r r - , and ii) the current expectation of the next tender rate change, zt. Since the
solutions are linear, they lend them easily to empirical estimation, and allow one
to obtain, also in closed-form the implied time series properties of interest rates.
Specifically BBF (1997) show that
21
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The factor loading on the market expectation is very cumbersome and may cause
problems with computer memory, since the binomial coefficients can assume
large values, once s gets very large, while n obtains intermediate values.
22 Luckily
we are able to simplify the factor loading on the market expectation considerably
                                                
20 Let us define the random variable (rv) x as the number of trials – random experiments – where a
particular event does not occur, i.e. the number of futile or empty trials. Then x is geometrically
distributed with parameter n, x ~ Geom(n), if x takes non-negative integer values and if its
frequency function, f(k), say, is given by P{x = k} = f(k) = n(1–n)
k. The cumulative distribution
function of the geometric distribution is thus F(k) = S




summation starts from j=0). Geometric distribution is closely related to the exponential
distribution, which is continuous, since the distribution function of an exponentially distributed rv
with per unit time probability n, G(x), say, is given by G(x) = 1–e
-nx » 1–(1–n)
x for small n and
positive x.
21 The derivations are in BBF (1997, Appendices A2 and A3) or in BBFK (1998, p. 39–41).
22 This actually is what happened to us.18




s. It turns out that the factor loading on the market expectation has a
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Hence, the resulting term structure features three underlying factors: firstly, the
tender rate, which follows a generalised random walk on random time steps, and
which is directly under the control of the central bank; secondly, the market
expectation of the size of the next tender rate change zt, which is stationary, but
has local martingale dynamics between target changes; finally, deviations of the
short rate from the tender rate, which is generated by a mean reverting (towards
zero) linear process (BBF 1997, p. 239).
Note that as the time to maturity, t, increases the factor loading on the
deviation of the short rate from the tender rate,  m
t
m
t r r L
- , falls, while the factor
loading on market expectations, 
t z L , increases. More specifically, as the time to
maturity of the debt instrument increases without bound, the yield converges to
t
m
t t z r R + =
¥ , if n > 0, so that the spread between the long rate and the tender rate
is fully determined by the market expectation of the size of the next tender rate
realisation. The interpretation here is – and this is the feature that makes the
model nice and intuitively plausible – that day to day fluctuations in the shorter
end of the yield spectrum reflect mainly movements around the tender rate  tm r,
whereas the further one looks into the future, the less important is the current
deviation from the tender rate, and the more relevant the possibility of a tender
rate change as measured by zt (BBF 1997, p. 239).
To develop some intuition for the dynamic behaviour of the factor structure
underlying longer-term interest rates, note that the probability of at least one
target change in s periods is, from the binomial distribution, equal to
1–P{no target changes in s periods} = 1–(1–n)
s. This is clearly increasing in s.
This implies, in effect, that as the time to maturity of the underlying debt
instrument increases, the probability of at least one target change during its term
also increases. As the yield to maturity increases without bound, for example, the
probability of at least one target change increases to one, while mean reversion in
short rates will be fully realised, so that the spread of the corresponding long-term
interest rate about the tender rate will indeed be fully determined by the market
expectation of the next target change. All this is certainly very intuitive.
One of the great merit of the stylised model presented above is that we are
able to extract market expectations concerning tender rate changes from
observable time series. Once estimates of the various structural parameters of the
model are available, the simple affine factor structure of the model lets us infer
expected tender rate changes zt from data on realised tender rate changes and
observed term structure spreads.
                                                
23 Note that 
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 by the binomial expansion of the
expression (a + b)
s.19
3 Taking the model to the Finnish data
3.1 Institutional data on monetary policy in Finland
Before actually taking the model to the daily data on Finnish government’s bond
yields – obtained from Nelson-Siegel estimates of the yield curve (yields at
different maturities on zero-coupon bonds) – we would like to make some
comments concerning the institutional framework for monetary policy in Finland
and the BoF operating procedures. First of all, as BBF (1997) and BBFK (1998)
document, the Fed tightly targeted the O/N fed funds rate during the period of
analysis of these two studies (1985–1992 and 1989–1996, respectively).
24 The
importance of the O/N interest rates in the Finnish money markets, on the other
hand, was reduced after the inception of the BoF liquidity credit facility in July
1992, which replaced the former call money facility. To get liquidity credit from
the BoF in the new facility, banks had to provide acceptable collateral, for
example banks’ CDs. The maturity of the liquidity credit in the new facility was
typically seven, but could in principle also be one, 14, 21 or 28 days. This is in
contrast to the previous call money facility, which operated on O/N credit. The
major reason for switching to longer-term credit was to further strengthen the
incentives for the banks to smooth out differences in their liquidity positions
among themselves and not to rely on central bank funds. One of the objectives
was also to reduce the volatility of the O/N interest rates.
25
The price structure of the new liquidity credit system was determined in terms
of the (one month’s) tender rate; the liquidity credit rate was set two percentage
points above and the deposit rate two percentage points below the tender rate. As
for the determination of the tender rate itself, the BoF could either use price or
quantity tenders, when implementing its market operations or interventions
through (mostly) monthly liquidity tenders. In price tenders, the BoF fixed the
quantity of liquidity, whereas in quantity tenders it fixed the price of liquidity.
After December 1994, the BoF more consistently opted for quantity tenders.
26
Overall, the parameters of the liquidity credit system – liquidity credit and deposit
rates, maturity of the liquidity credit etc. – was set so that the banking sector had
sufficient liquidity for a smooth operation of the payment system in normal
circumstances without compromising the efficiency of interest rate steering by the
BoF. Market interventions, in turn, were used for the purpose of interest rate
steering.
                                                
24 Tight targeting by the Fed was de facto abandoned in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market
crash and during the highly volatile Gulf was (BBF 1997, p. 228). Furthermore, targets were not
strictly implemented in the first part of the available data in BBF (1997); only in 1987 did the Fed
stop declaring targets for M1, which is a clear indication of mounting difficulties of controlling
monetary and credit aggregates rather than interest rates (BBF 1997, p. 228).
25 In July 1993 the new system of minimum reserve requirements was introduced. Minimum
reserves were initially calculated on the basis of reserve base prevailing in the last day of a month,
but was later changed into one based on monthly averages. Välimäki (1998) analyses the effects of
this change on the volatility of the O/N interest rate.
26 Note that the tender rate could be changed, on the decision by the board of the BoF, on any
weekday, even though it has a reference maturity of one month. Thus, the probability of a tender
rate change on any day, n, is positive.20
The  modus operandi of monetary policy has undergone (small) changes
during the period of our analysis. As noted above, since December 1994 the BoF
consistently opted for quantity tenders. Our full data set on yield curve estimates
covers the period from 1.1.1993 to 15.6.1998, but we must shortened our sample
to make it more homogenous in terms of the operating procedures of monetary
policy. To this end, we have shifted the starting day of our sample to December 1,
1994. On the other hand, in November 1997, the Bank of Finland announced that
it will cut down the maturity of tender rate to two weeks (from one month).
Hence, we further shortened our sample by bringing the end of the sample from
15.6.1998 back to 31.10.1997.
27 Finally, in February 1996, the BoF switched to
full allotments in its liquidity tenders. Since the data and the estimation results did
not, however, indicate any breaks at this time point, we decided to leave the end
date of the sample at 31.10.1997.
Overall, then, the evolution of the modus operandi of monetary policy in
Finland over the last 10–15 years suggests that the relative importance of the O/N
facility diminished. The call money market, on the other hand, developed and
specialised, increasingly so after the inception of the new liquidity credit facility
in 1992, into a system maintaining banks’ liquidity needs, whereas the role of
market interventions in interest rate steering increased. Given the increased
emphasis on market interventions, the tender rate, in turn, developed into the key
interest rate instrument of monetary policy and clearly assumed a role of a
(generalised) “target” interest rate, not so much for the O/N interest rate, but more
generally for short-term interest rates. This is how we interpret the role of the
tender rate – “a mean for the market” – in this study and this is what motivates
taking the model to the Finnish data.
3.2 Yield curve estimation: The Nelson-Siegel approach
Appendix 1 contains an introduction to the main ideas underlying the Nelson-
Siegel approach to estimating yield curves from the (price and yield) data on
tradable (coupon) bonds. Here we will just briefly summarise.
28 The need for
estimating yield curves from data on tradable bonds comes from the fact that
mostly observable yields at maturities longer than 12 months are yields on coupon
bonds, whereas the very notion of a yield curve refers to yields at different
maturities on zero-coupon bonds. A yield on a coupon bond is a complicated
average of a specific portfolio of zero-coupon bonds; a coupon bond can be
thought of as being composed of a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds, where the
shortest zero-coupon bond has a maturity that matches the date of the first coupon
payment, and the maturity of the longest zero-coupon bond corresponds to the
date of the last coupon payment. Anyway, due to the fact that so few of the
tradable bonds are zero-coupon ones, the problem of con-structing yield curves
from the data becomes one of estimating the “implicit” yields on zero-coupon
bonds by fitting functional forms to the data (on yields) on tradable bond.
29
                                                
27 Later, in 1998, the maturity of the tender rate was further cut down to a week as part of the
process of trying to align the operating procedures of the central banks entering the monetary
union from the beginning of 1999.
28 The main reference here is Dahlqvist and Svensson (1994).
29 We should say, of course, “by finding the best fitting functional form to the data”.21
The Nelson-Siegel (NS) approach to estimating the yield curve is based on the
following functional form for the instantaneous forward rate with settlement (and





















exp ) b , m ( ƒ 2 1 0 (9)
where b = (b0, b1, b2, t)' is the vector of parameters (to be estimated). As for the
theoretical underpinnings of the functional in (9), Nelson and Siegel (1987)
assume that the instantaneous forward rate is the solution to a second-order partial
differential equation with two equal roots.
30
The parameters of the NS functional form has specific (economic)
interpretation, a fact that must enhance its popularity as a model of the yield
curve. Note first, however, that the spot rate, s(m), say, corresponding to the NS
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From (9) and (10) we can immediately see that
1 0
0
b) s(0; b) ƒ(0;
and ) b ; ( s ) b ; ( ƒ
b + b = =
b = ¥ = ¥
(11)
So b0 corresponds to the long-term interest rate, while b0+b1 is associated with the
short end of the maturity spectrum, the “O/N” interest rate. b1/b2 on the other
hand determines the stationary point of the forward curve, given that such a point
exists;
32 suppose that there exists  0 m ˆ ³  such that  0
m














                                                
30 Longstaff-Schwatz (1992) approach to estimating the yield curve could alternatively be used. It
is based on a model where there are two state variables, the instantaneous spot rate and the spot
rate’s instantaneous rate of variance. The two state variables are assumed to follow mean-reverting
stochastic processes. We followed the NS approach because of its simplicity and “robustness”
properties emphasised by Dahlqvist and Svensson (1994).
31 The spot rate, s(m), is equal to the average of the forward rates over the term of the underlying
instrument:  ds ) s ( ƒ
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it follows that the sign of b2 determines the nature of the stationary point of the
forward function, i.e. whether there exists a maximum or minimum; negative b2
implies a minimum, while positive b2 is associated with a maximum of the
forward function. In summary, then, the parameters b0,  b1,  b2 and t are
determined recursively in order by ƒ(¥), ƒ(0),  b) ; m ˆ ƒ(  and m ˆ . The parameters are
therefore very intuitive, and it is easy to find suitable starting values for an
optimisation procedure. Finally, having obtained the spot rate s(m; b), the NS
discount function is given by
) m ) b ; m ( s exp( ) b ; m ( d - = (15)
The time series of estimated spreads of one, three, six and 12 months yield from
the tender rate over the sample from 1.12.1994 to 31.10.1997 are given in Figure
2. These spreads are rather volatile and display persistence, although there is
considerably less persistence in these spreads than in the corresponding levels of
the yields. In fact, we cannot, at conventional significance levels, reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the level of each of the three yields, whereas it can
decisively be rejected in the spreads.
33 It should, however, be noted that the mean
reversion parameter k in the model for the short-term interest rate spread about the
tender rate, i.e. in model (1), is around 0.23. Hence, from the model’s point of
view, interest rate targeting has not been extremely tight, although official interest
rate policy has had an effect on market interest rates.
3.3 A measure of anticipated tender rate changes
Since the model’s closed form solution for longer-term interest rates is linear in
the three underlying factors (cf. eq. (6)), we can easily derive an estimate of the
market expectations factor zt from observable yield curve data, once we have
estimates of the various parameters of the model. We basically need an estimate
of the parameter vector b = (k, r)', where the components describe, respectively,
the degree of mean reversion in the short spread, k and the persistence of (the size
of) the tender rate changes, r. Tables in Appendix 2 contain OLS-estimates of the
                                                
33 These tests are not included in Appendix 1, which otherwise contains all of the estimation
results in the paper. They could be made available upon request to the authors, however. As for the
autocorrelation functions of the spreads, there is indication also in the Finnish data that longer
spreads are more persistent (cf. BBFK 1998). The evidence is not, however, as strong as in the US
data.23
various parameters of the model.
34 Here we reproduce the OLS-estimates of the
parameter vector b as well as of the standard deviation, se, of the white noise error
et in the following:








As it stands, these parameter values suggest that there is mean reversion in the
short spread, but the (estimated) intensity or degree of mean reversion in the short
rate is not overly high. Hence, the BoF was apparently able to control the short
rate only imperfectly. In the U.S. the intensity of the mean reversion seems to
have been changing considerably during the reserve maintenance period (10 days
or two weeks) over the period of analysis in BBF (1997) and BBFK (1998). The
time varying estimates of the intensity of mean reversion in vary in the range [–
0.213, 0.763] in BBF (1997, Table 1) and in the range [0.046, 0.955] in BBFK
(1998, Table 4). Consequently, the estimate of k from the Finnish data is well
within the range of these reference estimates. As for the other measure of the
tightness of targeting, the standard deviation se, its estimate in the Finnish data is
somewhat in the upper range of the times varying estimates obtained by BBF
(1997, Table 1), but compares well with the range estimated by BBFK (1998,
Table 4). Finally, persistence in the policy rate, r, although somewhat lower, is
also in line with the estimates obtained by BBF (1997, Appendix A1) and by
BBFK (1998, Table 4). Overall, then, the parameter estimates in Table 1 appear to
be reasonable and in line with the corresponding estimates reported in the
reference literature.
35
As for the probability of a tender rate change on any particular day, note that,
from the point of view of the market, we are effectively modelling changes in the
tender rate as outcomes in independent Bernoulli random experiments with
constant probability n of the “event happening”, i.e. of observing a tender rate
change on any day. Furthermore, given our modelling assumptions associated
with the policy process, the size of the (next) tender rate change at any particular
point in time should not, in particular, depend on the time interval between two
consecutive tender rate changes. Nor the other way around, i.e. the time interval
                                                
34 OLS-estimation may entail some efficiency losses in the present context. We are planning to
follow BBFK (1998) to produce the full set of GMM parameter estimates.
35 BBF (1997, Appendix A1) report also estimates of the policy persistence parameter r from the







, where x is the parameter to be estimated, ensure that r lies between zero and one (we
observe positive autocorrelation in target changes).24
between two consecutive tender rate changes should not depend on the size of the
(realised) tender rate changes. Following BBF (1997) and BBFK (1998) we
performed regression tests to see if these two hypotheses should be rejected in the
Finnish data (see Appendix 2, Tables A4 and A5). The data does not seem to
indicate any significant effects from the length of the no-tender rate-change-spell
to the size of the (next) tender rate change or of the reverse effect, i.e. from the
realised tender rate changes to the length of the notender rate change-spell. Hence,
we conclude that the empirical evidence does not seem to be at odds with our
modelling assumptions concerning the policy process.
Having obtained estimates for the model’s parameters, we can use the closed
from solution for the long-term interest rate, equation (6), to solve for the






















where the factor loadings are given in equations (7) and (8). In particular, given
the parameter estimates, the factor loadings for the terms of one, three, six and 12
months are, respectively, 0, 0.4017, 0.8285 and 1.3163 for the expectations factor




t r r - . Note that
the r.h.s. of equation (16) contains only observables (given the estimates), so we
can, in effect, construct an estimate of the market expectations factor using our
data on yields and the tender rate. Graphs of these estimates using yields at three,
six and 12 maturity are given in figures 3a–c.
The estimates of the market expectations factor display some interesting
features.
36 First of all, the estimate derived from the three month’s yield appears
to be highly volatile.
37 Estimates at longer maturities are smoother as display
more definitive trends in market expectations and, in particular, differences
relative to realised tender rate changes. At a closer look, however, one can see that
at three months, the weight of the “market opinion” – estimated market
expectation – is relative well aligned with realised tender rate changes, apart,
perhaps, from one or two in the first part of the sample period. For example, in
June 1995 (at approximately the observation number 185 in Figure 3a), the BoF
raised the tender rate by 25 bps, amid market views that tended to favour tender
rate cuts. This is clearly seen in Figure 4a; the weight of the (estimated) market
opinion well before June 1995 favours a tender rate cut. Immediately after the
tender rate hike, the weight of the (estimated) market opinion shifts in favour of
future tender rate increases. This response from the market to the realised tender
rate hike in June 1995 is as if markets thought the BoF acts on its private
information about the state of the economy, most notably of inflation and its
(short-term) prospects.
                                                
36 In constructing the estimates of the parameters of the model as well as in constructing the graphs
of the estimates of the market expectations factor, we have consistently used calendar days. We
did not, however, correct for the weekends in the determination of the maturity of the bonds as in
BBF (1997, p. 236) and in BBFK (1998, p. 44). Note also that we have not constructed the
confidence intervals for the estimates of the market expectations factor using the simulation
exercise detailed in BBF (1997, Appendix  A1).
37 The estimate derived from the one month’s yield is similarly highly volatile.25
At longer maturities the extracted market expectations series predicts well the
sign of the next tender rate change, particularly in the first part of the sample
period. Note also how the tender rate hike in June 1995 had a noticeable effect on
the (estimated) market view about the likely path of the future tender rate. By
June 1995 markets appeared to act on the assumption that within the (next) six
months, and perhaps also within the (next) 12 months, horizon there would not be
any tender rate increases. After the tender rate hike we can observe a shift in the
estimated market opinion to favour tender rate increases within the following
6–12 months horizon. We can, however, observe large differences between
estimated market expectations of and realised tender rate changes. Most notably,
during the first months of the sample, market expectations of the size of the next
tender rate change were considerably larger than the realised ones. Also, towards
the end of the sample (i.e. 1997) the weight of the market opinion did not seem to
favour tender rate hikes at the six month’s horizon (Figure 3b), but at the 12
month’s horizon there are indications that markets anticipated tender rate
increases (Figure 3c). No tender rate hikes during 1997, however. Hence, overall
we can say that the estimates indicate that markets at times overestimate the
subsequent rise in the tender rate, a feature that is clearly present also in the U.S.
data (BBF 1997, BBFK 1998).
4 Conclusions; anticipated policy dynamics and
the performance of the EHTS
BBF (1997) argue that their simple model of interest rate targeting is able to
explain the underprediction anomaly obtained in testing the validity of the
coefficient restriction implied by the EHTS in regressing long-term movements of
short-term interest rates on the current term spread. The EHTS implies that the
slope coefficient a should equal one in the following regression:
38
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where f reflects time invariant (maybe maturity specific) term premiums. BBF’s
(1997, 236) estimate for a is 0.576,
39 implying underprediction. BBF (1997, p.
236–237 and p. 244–245) offer an explanation for this apparent underprediction
                                                
38 The error term ut+hm–m has an MA(t–m) structure under the EHTS. Note, further, that (17) can
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, where the difference
operator  D
m is defined by D
mXt = Xt – Xt–m for the variable Xt. Hence, if interest rates of different
maturities are generated by unit root processes, then, since the l.h.s. above is stationary, the spread
must be stationary, i.e. long and short rates must be cointegrated with a cointegrating vector
(1, –1)’. In fact, EHTS has a stronger cointegration implication: there must be p–1 cointegrating
vectors among p different bond yields. Engsted and Tanggaard (1994) test this particular
implication of the EHTS using U.S. data and cannot reject it. In the Finnish data, over the period
of analysis of the present paper at least, there is weak evidence against this implication.
39 The standard error is 0.182.26
anomaly
40 in terms of the markets underestimation of the future fed funds target
changes. More specifically, they derive a measure of the market’s forecast of
future target changes using data on yield spreads and their estimates of the factor
loadings. Then they regress realised target changes on a constant and this measure
of the market’s forecast of target changes and obtain a slope coefficient of 0.503
(when the target changes are uncorrelated). Under their modelling assumptions
that the EHTS holds,
41 the process generating deviations of the O/N fed funds rate
from the target is well understood by the market
42 and that these deviations are
independent of target changes, the authors argue that the observed underprediction
is due to the (even greater) underprediction by the market of the future (longer-
term) changes in the fed funds target rate, i.e. misperception of the fed funds rate
dynamics.
The explanation proposed by BBF (1997) to account for the much discussed
anomaly in the U.S. nominal term structure of interest rates is, to our minds,
certainly interesting – and plausible we would like to add. The fact that BBF
(1997) is able to account for the underprediction anomaly in the nominal U.S.
term structure without resort to term premiums makes the underlying idea of their
model even more interesting. Time varying term premiums have often been
offered as the factor that explains the poor performance of the EHTS in the U.S.
data – at least the Campbell-Shiller type tests of the EHTS.
43 So, the natural
question in the present context is, firstly, whether there is a similar
underprediction anomaly in the Finnish data on estimated government bond yields
and, secondly and more importantly, can we plausibly explain this anomaly in
terms of market misperceptions concerning the dynamics of the BoF’s interest
rate policy.
In an attempt to formulate an opinion on these questions, we ran the
Campbell-Shiller test regression, equation (17), using estimated three, six and 12
months yields on Finnish government bonds. The estimation results are reported
in Table A2 (Appendix 2). According to the results the estimates of the slope
coefficient, a ˆ , are 1.2912, 0.9524 and 0.8307 using the three, six and 12 month’s
yield respectively.
44 So, we seem to have found, if anything, an overprediction
                                                
40 It should be noted, interestingly, that unobservable time-varying term premiums, suggested e.g.
MM (1986) as the underlying factor responsible for the downward bias in the slope coefficient a,
do not enter significantly in Campbell-Shiller test of the EHTS performed by BBF (1997, 233–
234), i.e. (17) with time-varying term premiums, ft.
41 So that, in particular, the long spread reflects market anticipations of future target changes.
42 I.e. markets have rational expectations concerning the O/N deviations from the target, so that
expectations are formed under the true process generating these deviations.
43 The conclusions drawn by Bekaert et al. (1997b) may be relevant in this context. The authors
review peso problem explanations of the (anomalous) behaviour of the U.S. term structure,
formalised as regime switching. They conclude that using the small sample distribution generated
by their regime switching model considerably weakens the evidence against the EHTS, but it
remained somewhat implausible that the model mechanism generated the U.S. data. However, a
model that combines moderate time variation in term premiums with peso problem effects is
largely consistent with the structure data from the U.S., UK and Germany. Also, see Bekaert and
Ang (1998) for a comprehensive treatment of (Markovian) regime switching in interest rates.
44 The standard errors are, respectively, 0.0935, 0.3002 and 0.02113. However, caution should be
exercised when interpreting the implied test statistics, like t-ratios, as well as the slope estimates
due to the possibility of biases in the tests and that standard distribution theory may be a poor
guide to inference in the context of (near) unit root behaviour of the underlying short-term interest
rate. Bekaert et al. (1997a) argue for the presence of biases in the standard tests of the EHTS due
to the persistence of the short rate, while Lanne (1997) argues for the use of (correct) distribution
theory (of near unit root processes) in these tests.27
relative to the EHTS at the shorter end of the yield spectrum. Underprediction
starts to emerge at longer maturities, but the test regression does not indicate
overly large discrepancies between the data and the EHTS at the six or even 12
month’s maturity. Looking at Figures 3a–c, we would like to argue that these
regression results are not actually surprising. In these figures we see major
differences between the realised and (measured or estimated) tender rate changes
precisely when using longer-term yields. Furthermore, these differences tend to
occur in the first part of the sample; towards the end of the sample, only the
estimate from the 12 month’s yield indicate qualitatively similar differences
between realisations and anticipations as we can observe in the first part of the
sample. We further checked for the validity of our guess that the slope coefficient
declines as the maturity of the underlying instrument increases: at the 18 and 24
month’s maturity the estimated slope coefficient is 0.6773 and 0.6721 respectively
(with standard errors of 0.0275 and 0.0440). Indeed then, the evidence from the
Finnish data seems to support to the idea the current spread between the long and
short rate underpredicts future changes in the short-term interest rate relative to
the EHTS.
Hence, we tentatively conclude that underprediction relative to the EHTS
seems be present in the Finnish data for longer-term, i.e. over 12 month’s, yields.
Quantitatively, it is as important as in the U.S. data for the shorter end of the
maturity spectrum, as presented by BBF (1997), for terms at 12–18, may even
months. Further work should, preferably, be done on this matter, and especially on
establishing the statistical significance of the estimates of the market expectations
of the next tender rate change.
45
As we noted earlier, the various estimates of the market expectations series zt
display relatively large amount of volatility. This brings us, quite naturally, to the
Nelson-Siegel approach to estimating the yields that we use in our study.
46 As we
saw earlier, the parameter of the NS functional form has intuitive interpretations;
overall we could say that it puts the emphasis on the asymptotic behaviour of the
interest rates. NS estimates of the yield curves are typically also relatively smooth,
the parameters of the model are stable and the model‘s convergence properties
very good. Furthermore, there seems to be a close correspondence between the
components of the NS model and factor analytic structures of bond returns:
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) found that three factors can account for most of
the variation in U.S. government bond yields and that these three factors are level,
steepness and curvature.
47 Despite all these desirable properties of the NS model,
we strongly feel that the NS approach itself can account at least partly for the
volatility of the estimated yields, most notably at the short end of the maturity
spectrum. Low number of tradable securities at relevant portions of the yield
curve for an extended period of trading days possibly together with large bid-ask
spreads could cause the estimated yields to display high volatility. Further work
should, however, be done on this matter.
                                                
45 BBF (1997, Appendix A1) obtain empirical standard errors through a series of simulations,
based on approximate normality (of the parameter estimators).
46 For a comparison between B splines and Nelson-Siegel methods using data on the prices of
USD, DEM, FRF, GBP and JPY government securities, see Seppälä – Viertiö (1996) and the
references cited therein. Interestingly, the authors tend to favour (Svensson’s (1994) extension of)
the Nelson-Siegel model to the estimation of the yield curve from the perspective of feasibility as a
trading tool. Dahlqvist and Svensson (1994), on the other hand, argue for the Nelson-Siegel
approach from the perspective of what is needed for monetary policy analysis.
47 As such the NS model lacks firm theoretical foundations, as do, of course, also spline methods.28
The modelling strategy introduced by BBF (1997) does not offer an economic
theory of how market participants form their expectations of future target changes.
But it does afford meaningful measurement with minimal theory. We should
emphasise the plausibility of the model’s underlying idea that infrequent policy or
target changes lead to persistent expectations of unrealised events which, in turn,
generate long-memory spreads between (shorter-term) interest rates and the
official steering rate. This perspective as well as the data used by BBF (1997) –
and also BBFK (1998) – offer, at a general level, insights into the nature of the
bias found by tests of the EHTS: given that the variation in the fed funds rate is
generated mainly by changes in the targets rather than by fluctuations about the
target, and since the latter are easily modelled (as being generated by a mean
reversion process) and should be well understood by the market, BBF (1997) and
BBFK (1998) gather evidence indicating that the bias pertains to the policy-
induced dynamics of the fed funds rate. On the empirical analysis of the Finnish
data, we tentatively endorse this conclusion or, to put it more accurately, strongly
recommend that the analysis be conducted with data on longer-term – term to
maturity exceeding 12 months – in-terest rates. Only with longer-term interest
rates can we clearly see
48 nontrivial expectations of future tender rate changes and
discrepancies between realised and expected tender rate changes. Also, biases in
the tests of the EHTS – the underprediction anomaly – start to emerge precisely
when we use longer-term interest rates in these tests.
Market misperceptions concerning future policy changes contrasts nicely with
alternative explanations of the poor empirical performance of the EHTS. Most
interestingly, time varying term risk premiums have often been proposed as the
principal source of rejection of the EHTS.
49 BBF (1997) deliberately abstracted
away from time-varying term premiums:
50 the authors wanted to see if measured
market misperceptions alone can account for the underprediction anomaly and, to
a large extent, it seems to be able to do so. However, very recent literature
51
argues, plausibly, that we should not view the general equilibrium bond pricing
models capable of generating time-varying risk premiums and peso problems
52
generated by regime switching – basically inference problems in small data
samples – as competing views of the term structure. Rather, they should be
considered as alternative views. For example, simulation results in Bekaert et al.
(1997b) suggest, if anything, that both regime switching and time-varying risk
premiums may have a role in explaining the behaviour of interest rates (at least in
the U.S., UK and Germany).
Hence, the interesting question focuses on the possibility of combining
general equilibrium bond pricing and peso problems. Evans (1998) is an attempt
to synthesise these two strands of literature to obtain a more balanced view of the
dynamics of the term structure. He combines affine class of general equilibrium
                                                
48 Although we did not provide confidence intervals for the estimated market expectations process
zt.
49 See e.g. Bekaert et al. (1997b) and the references therein.
50 Actually, their data does not seem to support the hypothesis of time-varying term premiums
(BBF 1997, p. 234).
51 See Evans (1998).
52 To repeat, the underlying idea of the analysis conducted by BBF (1997) is closely related to
peso problems, as the authors themselves note (1997, p. 225).29
models with state variables that follow regime switching processes.
53 The former
models can generate time-varying risk premiums from changes in the covariance
structure of shocks to the state variables that otherwise follow stable stochastic
processes. Hence, peso problems enter the analysis via regime switching in the
state variables.
54 One of the key ideas of Evans’s (1998) model is that peso
problems also distort small sample inferences about risk. As a consequence, the
risk premiums consistent with a rational investor’s view of future regime switches
can be very different than the small sample estimates.
At one level, then, this paper’s perspective to the term structure is similar to
the one (of affine class) where one of the state variables, the spread from the
target, follows a diffusion process while the other, target changes, follows a very
special “regime switching“ process. “Regime switching” generates peso problems.
What is specific about the model is that, at a practical level, it proposes a stylised
model of expectation formation and uses its parametric structure to infer, under
the EHTS, market expectations from the yield data. The model involves
autocorrelated tender rate changes, which implies, given that the estimated market
expectations concerning tender rate changes appear to be reasonable, that some
features of official interest rate steering are rationally incorporated into market
expectations. More complex model could extend the model to capture such
features as time variation in the daily probabilities of tender rate changes or
correlations and of course produce better estimates of market expectations. But
since the data on longer-term yields consistently displays features at odds with the
EHTS, we must conclude that in Finland too the process of tender rate changes
does not seem to be well anticipated by the market.
The fact the Finnish economy is (open and) small compared to the U.S.
economy, with both economies highly integrated to the international capital
markets, may bear on the exercise performed in this paper. Given the high degree
of integration in international capital markets, the term structure movements, in
particular, in different countries may be highly correlated. Being small in turn
implies that movements in the Finnish term structure of interest rates may be
fundamentally affected by international factors, most notably by the monetary –
more specifically interest rate – policy of the major central banks like the Fed and
the Bundesbank. Hence, the analysis in this paper could be usefully extended by
conditioning local term structure movements in the Finnish economy on e.g. the
Bundesbank’s interest rate policy. But this does not fundamentally change the key
question asked in this paper – it merely relocates the problem: the interesting
problem still is that potential market misperceptions about the central bank’s
future interest rate policy impinge upon the dynamics of the term structure.
Formal details of a model that captures these potential misperceptions will, most
probably, change from those of the present paper in the event the analysis is tuned
appropriately.
Finally, we can only speculate about the relevance of the modelling strategy
followed here in the monetary policy context of the ECB. Institutionally, the
                                                
53 Evans’s (1998) model has its antecedent in the model of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). See
also the related literature on affine class of general equilibrium models in e.g. Backus, Foresi,
Mozummdar and Wu (1997), Fisher and Gilles (1996) and Roberds and Whiteman (1996).
54 Evans’s model (1998) thus formalises the idea that the term structure is affected by instability in
state variables – inflation in particular. In this respect, the model builds on Hamilton (1988), Sola
and Driffil (1992) and Naik and Kee (1994), who examine term structure models where short rates
(= state variables) follow switching processes.30
operating procedures of the ECB’s monetary policy are roughly similar to those of
the BoF before the start of the monetary union. Hence, the (real?) possibility that
market only imperfectly understands the underlying process whereby the ECB
makes decisions about its steering rate – the repo rate – in a dynamic context may
have nonnegligible effects on dynamic behaviour of the term structure of interest
rates in the monetary union (and in Europe more generally) in a way captured by
the model of BBF (1997). There are a number of question we could raise in this
context, for future research if not otherwise. First, we could ask whether the
measured expectations of steering rate changes are consistent with the central
bank’s desiderata. The model is explicit on the consequences of a slack between
instruments and objectives of monetary policy; in its effort to anticipate future
policy, the public accumulates information, and this translates into highly
persistent spreads between the steering rate and longer-term interest rates.
Whether such a slack is desirable from the point of view of policy makers, is an
open question. The variability of the innovations in the zt process is an indicator
of how intensive this information acquisition will be and of how successful the
ECB will be in keeping its intentions secret and preserving a discretionary role for
policy. At the same time, however, a higher variability of the innovations in the
market expectations process means looser control of longer-term interest rates.
Hence, a trade-off between secrecy and interest rate control could arise, of which
the ECB should be aware of.31
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Appendix 1
The Nelson-Siegel approach to estimating the yield curve
The starting point for the estimation of the term structure of interest rates is an
assumption regarding the functional form between interest rates (spot and
forward) or discount factors on one hand and time to maturity on the other hand.
Discount factors describe the present value of one unit, which is to be paid in
some future point of time. Discount function (dt,m) is the collection of discount
factors at time t for all maturities m. Spot rates or zero-coupon rates (st,m) are
related by
m , t m , t m , t m , t log
m
1
s and ) m s exp( d - = - = d (A1)
The instantaneous forward rate is the forward rate for which the difference
between settlement date (i.e. the date when investment starts) and maturity date
approaches zero. In practise it can be identified as an overnight interest rate. The
instantaneous forward rate (ƒ) can be seen as the marginal increase in the rate of
return, which results from marginal increase in the length of the investment. The
spot rate is the average of instantaneous forward rates up to the time to maturity
m:
) ms exp( ƒ(t)dt exp or ƒ(t)dt
m
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Nelson and Siegel (1987) model explicitly the implied forward rate curve. They
choose a parsimonious functional form, which allows the forward rate curve to
take various different shapes.
They suggest that the instantaneous forward rate is the solution to the 2nd
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where b denotes the vector of parameters (b0, b1, b2, t1) to be estimated and m
denotes time to maturity.
By integrating over the time interval [0, m] and dividing by m the following
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The Nelson-Siegel approach has some intuitive asymptotic properties: For long
maturities, spot and forward rates approach asymptotically the value b0, which
must be positive. b0+b1, also positive, determines the starting value for spot and
forward rates at maturity zero. b2 and t1 do not have direct interpretation but are
scale parameters and responsible for a hump-shape. b2 gives hump’s magnitude
and t1 determines hump’s position, both of these must be positive.
The objective of the estimation procedure is to estimate the parameter vector
b. The first important choice is to decide whether to minimise price or yield
errors. Since in monetary policy analysis the focus is on interest rates, it seems
natural to minimise the deviation between estimated and observed yields. The first
step is to initialise the parameter vector b. Now, the discount function can be
calculated (given parameters b). The estimated discount function ( ) m , t ˆ d  is used to
compute estimated bond prices according
å
=
d + d = d + d + + d =
M
1 m
i M , t i m , t i M , t i M , t i 1 , t i , t N ˆ c ˆ N ˆ c ˆ ... c ˆ p ˆ (A5)
Next yield to maturity is estimated for each coupon bond i by solving
0 p ˆ ) M r ˆ exp( N ) t r ˆ exp( c i , t i i i
M
m t
i = - - + - å
=
(A6)
At both stages the estimation is started from the pre-selected values of parameters
and is ran as long as convergence is achieved. When yield errors are minimised
parameters are chosen by minimising the sum of squared yield errors between
estimated ) r ˆ ( i , t  and observed yields by applying non-linear optimisation procedure
(in our case with maximum likelihood).
Once the parameter vector b is estimated and obtained spot rates and
instantaneous forward rate can determined (for any maturity) by inserting beta
vector into equations (2) and (1), respectively. Furthermore, implied forward rates
are easily calculated from spot rates – let t0 < t’ < T. Then forward rate is related
to the spot rates according to
' t T
) ' t , t ( s ) t ' t ( ) T , t ( s ) t T (





Inserting (2) into definition of discount factor yields the following equation for the
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For further analysis see Dahlqvist and Svensson (1994).36
Appendix 2
Point estimates of the parameters














Table A2. Tests of the EHTS
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Table A3. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test





Table A4. Absolute size of the target change vs length of the
no-spell period
Model:
t t t N N
m






Table A5. No-target-change spells vs absolute size of target
change
Model:
t 1 t t N
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Table A6. The tender rate process
Model: 




N r r x + D r = D
-
Parameter Estimate
r 0.5349
(3.3662)